Planners at Central Command wanted to cut by half through air attacks the combat effectiveness of the Medina Division, which was deployed near Baghdad, before American ground forces reached it.
Air power was to be supplemented and eventually supplanted by artillery, rocket and helicopter strikes before tanks and infantry engaged Iraqi forces on the ground.
Franks' original time-line, according to pre-war briefings, had ground forces in Baghdad on Day 10.
Things did not work out quite that way - fortuitously, as it turned out. Iraqi resistance damaged army attack helicopters, and the 3rd Division slowed its advance to wait for its follow-on unit, the 101st Airborne Division, as well as for supplies. The weather also played a role.
But through air power, the time was put to good use, not only by redirecting strike sorties but also through the use of all-weather weapons.
Saturday, June 07, 2003
THE UNPRECEDENTED JOINTNESS of the Iraqi war is responsible for the speed of the victory argues this article. And while I believe this to be true, I also think the fact Iraq had a terrible army also contributed to the speed of the victory. There is an old saying in the Army..."Never forget that the enemy gets a vote." And in many cases the regular forces voted with their feet, their ineptitude or both.
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